This paper examines two puzzles of indeterminacy. The first puzzle concerns the hypothesis that there is a unified phenomenon of indeterminacy. How are we to reconcile this with the apparent diversity of reactions that indeterminacy prompts? The second puzzle focuses narrowly on borderline cases of vague predicates. How are we to account for the lack of theoretical consensus about what the proper reaction to borderline cases is? I suggest (building on work by Maudlin) that the characteristic feature of indeterminacy is (...) alethic normative silence, and use this to explain both plurality and lack of consensus. (shrink)

This paper outlines Lewis’s favoured foundational account of linguistic representation, and outlines and briefly evaluates variations and modifications. Section 1 gives an opinionated exegesis of Lewis’ work on the foundations of reference—his interpretationism. I look at the way that the metaphysical distinction between natural and non-natural properties came to play a central role in his thinking about language. Lewis’s own deployment of this notion has implausible commitments, so in section 2 I consider variations and alternatives. Section 3 briefly considers a (...) buck-passing strategy involving fine-grained linguistic conventions. (shrink)

An alleged moral right to informational privacy assumes that we should have control over information about ourselves. What is the philosophical justification for this control? I think that one prevalent answer to this question—an answer that has to do with the justification of negative rights generally—will not do.

On what grounds will the rational man become a Christian? It is often assumed by many, especially non-Christians, that he will become a Christian if and only if he judges that the evidence available to him shows that it is more likely than not that the Christian theological system is true, that, in mathematical terms, on the evidence available to him, the probability of its truth is greater than half. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate whether or (...) not this is a necessary and sufficient condition for the rational man to adopt Christianity. (shrink)

The dissertation does not attempt to develop a critical policy science. It attempts to investigate the possibility of one raised by writers such as Habermas. The question arises because the policy sciences are increasingly beset by aporias. These aporias are occasioned by widening perception of the limits of societal rationalization, by worries about "destructuration," and by the increasingly ideological nature of policy science. ;The first section traces the origins of the policy sciences and their development, particularly during the late nineteenth (...) and early twentieth centuries. In this period, as today, governments, foundations, and professional societies, as well as economic, political, and social events, were instrumental in defining social- and policy-scientific problems and methodologies. From this, I extrapolate the fundamental assumptions of conventional policy science--the default theory. ;The next section criticizes basic elements of the default theory as to the nature of social science and social explanation. I argue that social sciences are sciences of various aspects of intentionality and the policy sciences are best conceived of as disciplinary technologies, in Foucault's sense. I then analyze intentionality more closely and develop a theory of social explanation that accommodates it. ;The third section criticizes the elements of the default theory as to morality and legitimacy, particularly claims that rational choice theory tells us something useful about morality. It does this only indirectly by contributing to a better theory of moral error. I next discuss the duality of moral standpoints and the difficulties this creates for solving the problem of legitimacy. The discussion shows, among other things, why utilitarianism fails. ;The concluding chapter argues that Habermas' proposal for a critical policy science based on undistorted rational agreement also fails. It is a self-estrangement theory and, however attractive it is to contemplate this ideal, it fails to project a system that is motivationally reasonable to live by. As Foucault says, critical task today is "to promote new forms of subjectivity through refusal of kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries.". (shrink)

This early work by Robin G. Collingwood was originally published in 1924 and we are now republishing it with a brand new introductory biography. 'Speculum Mentis' is an academic work on the subject of philosophy. Robin George Collingwood was born on 22nd February 1889, in Cartmel, England. He was the son of author, artist, and academic, W. G. Collingwood. He was greatly influenced by the Italian Idealists Croce, Gentile, and Guido de Ruggiero. Another important influence was his father, a professor (...) of fine art and a student of Ruskin. He published many works of philosophy, such as Speculum Mentis (1924), An Essay on Philosophic Method (1933), and An Essay on Metaphysics (1940). (shrink)

Mr Olding's recent attack on my exposition of the argument from design gives me an opportunity to defend the central theses of my original article. My article pointed out that there were arguments from design of two types—those which take as their premisses regularities of copresence and those which take as their premisses regularities of succession. I sought to defend an argument of the second type. One merit of such an argument is that there is no doubt about the truth (...) of its premisses. Almost all objects in the world behave in a highly regular way describable by scientific laws. Further, any scientific explanation of such a regularity must invoke some more general regularity. The most general regularities of all are, as such, scientifically inexplicable. The question arises whether there is a possible explanation of another kind which can be provided for them, and whether their occurrence gives any or much support to that explanation. I urged that we do explain some phenomena by explanation of an entirely different kind from the scientific. We explain states of affairs by the action of agents who bring them about intentionally of their own choice. Regularities of succession, as well as other phenomena may be explained in this way. Explanation of this kind I will term intentional explanation. Intentional explanation of some phenomenon E consists in adducing an agent A who brought E about of his own choice and a further end G which, he believed, would be forwarded by the production of E. (shrink)

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.